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In making a new judgment, a person can access relevant past judgments and/ 
or process the stimulus information underlying these judgments. The present 
study is concerned with (i) the conditions under which past judgments are used 
instead of stimulus information and (ii) the effects that repeated past judgments 
have on the representation of the stimulus information in memory. Three ex- 
periments were conducted using an impression formation task. Subjects were 
presented with trait descriptions of hypothetical individuals and were asked to 
make one, three, or five impression judgments on the basis of each description. 
It was hypothesized that a new impression will tend to be based on an old one, 
rather than on trait information, as a function of the ease with which the new 
impression can be inferred from the old. Ease of inference, in turn, will depend 
on the similarity of the two impressions and the availability of the past impression. 
The results of the three studies are consistent with this hypothesis: When past 
judgments were available, (Expermints 1 and 3), the extent to which they, rather 
than the trait information, determined the present judgment increased with the 
similarity between them. However, when another activity interpolated between 
the old and the new judgments (Experiment 2), thus making the past judgment 
more dimcult to access, the tendency to use the latter diminished considerably. 
Afterjudging, subjects were given a surprise recognition test for the trait information. 
Recognition accuracy was superior following a series of related judgments than 
following unrelated judgments, suggesting that the elaborations and inferences 
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activated by the stimulus information tend to accumulate more under related 
judgments than under unrelated ones. 0 1985 Academic Press. Inc. 
While it may be impossible to step into the same impression twice, 
our present opinion of others is often highly influenced by the opinions 
we have formed about them in the past. The present study is concerned 
with the nature of this influence. More specifically, we examine the 
conditions under which new judgments are based on old ones rather than 
on the stimulus information (and vice versa). In addition, we attempt to 
demonstrate that the organization of the stimulus information in memory 
depends on how it is used in arriving at these judgments. 
To begin with, let us describe the operations performed on the stimulus 
information when an impression is initially formed. We consider here 
three processes: comprehension, intregration, and abstraction (a more 
complete discussion can be found in Burnstein & Schul, 1982; Schul, 
1983). Comprehension refers to the interpretation of the stimulus infor- 
mation. It is highly dependent on the encoding schema so that the same 
stimulus may receive as many different interpretations as there are available 
encoding schemata (e.g., Alba & Hasher, 1983; Higgins & Rhoies, 1976; 
Schneider & Blankmaker, 1983; Taylor & Cracker, 1981). 
Once the stimulus information is understood, two additional operations 
must be performed, namely integration and abstraction. In impression 
formation, integration refers to the linking together of several traits into 
a unified description of a person (Burnstein & Schul, 1982; Lingle & 
Ostrom, 1979; Wyer & Srull, 1981; Wyer, Srull, & Gordon, 1984). The 
latter representation contains information directly given in the stimulus, 
as well as information adduced by elaborating upon the stimulus (Bumstein 
& Schul, 1983, Carlston, 1980; see also Bransford, Barclay, & Franks, 
1972; Tsujimoto, 1978). Next, some global meaning, gist, theme, or sum- 
mary is abstracted and stored separately in memory (N. Anderson & 
Farkas, 1973; N. Anderson & Hubert, 1963; Ebbesen, 1980; Posner & 
Snyder, 1975; Schul, 1983; but see Wyer et al., 1984). This abstract code 
may be regarded the “pure” judgment inasmuch as it reflects the impression 
prior to it being translated into a particular response format. According 
to hierarchical network models of memory, such impressions are stored 
at the highest level of a tree structure, whereas the trait descriptions as 
well as the elaborations made on them are stored at lower levels (e.g., 
Hastie & Kumar, 1979; Schul & Burnstein, 1983; Smith, Adams, & 
Schorr, 1978). 
If a series of judgments is made about the same person, then the later 
judgments can be characterized by the type of information upon which 
they are based, that is, whether they use the abstract code of an earlier 
impression or the stimulus information that underlies it. Recent research 
has documented that when individuals are asked to make two judgments 
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about another, the second of which is memory based, this later judgment 
tends to depend mostly on the earlier one and little on the trait information 
(Carlston, 1980; Lingle & Ostrom, 1979; Lingle, Geva, Ostrom, Leippe, 
& Baumgardner, 1979; Loken, 1984; Sherman, Zehner, Johnson, & Hirt, 
1983; Wyer et al., 1984; but see Lingle & Ostrom, 1979, and Lingle, 
Dukerich, & Ostrom, 1983, for conditions under which individuals do 
use the trait information in memory-based judgments). The present study 
attempts to extend these findings by exploring the conditions under which 
a new impression will be derived from an old one, rather than from the 
stimulus information when the stimulus information is actually present. 
Let us consider the case in which individuals are asked to make the 
second of two identical judgments. Even if the stimulus information were 
present, it would not be surprising if they paid no attention to it and 
simply retrieved the earlier judgment, reporting it as the new judgment 
(see “selection” rule (Step 3) in Smith, 1984). This is unlikely to occur, 
however, when individuals are instructed to make a series of completely 
unrelatedjudgments. To wit, if two judgements are completely unrelated, 
by definition, one judgment cannot be inferred from the other. Under 
these conditions, therefore, individuals are likely to ignore the old judgment 
and to reprocess the stimulus information in the making of the new 
judgment. Note that processing in this circumstances is likely to require 
reencoding of the information within a new interpretive schema (see 
below). Finally, there is the inbetween case in which the second judgment 
is neither irrelevant nor identical to the first, but is related to it. Here, 
the person may make use of the earlier judgment, the stimulus information, 
or, most likely, both. 
To summarize, even though in all three cases-identical, unrelated, 
and related-a later judgment can be made on the basis of the stimulus 
information alone, this, in fact, is unlikely to happen. According to our 
analysis, after individuals have made several identical judgments they 
will be most likely to access their earlier judgments and least likely to 
process the stimulus information. After individuals have made several 
related judgments, they are likely to access the earlier judgment as well 
as to process the stimulus information. And finally, after individuals have 
made a series of unrelated judgments they are least likely to access their 
earlier judgments and most likely to process the stimulus information. 
If this analysis is correct, two types of predictions can be made. First, 
it is likely that judgments based on the abstract code, here, the past 
impression, are faster than ones that are based on the underlying stimulus 
information, here, the trait description, since the later judgments are 
based on several traits that may require integration. Therefore, the time 
needed to make the second of two judgments should depend on the 
relationship between them: Later identical judgments will be fastest, 
while later unrelated judgments will be slowest. This follows because if 
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earlier and later judgments are identical, individuals need activate only 
a single piece of knowledge, namely, the abstract code, and can ignore 
the stimulus information. If the two judgments are unrelated, individuals 
can ignore the abstract code, but they must reencode several pieces of 
knowledge, namely, the stimulus information. 
The case for related judgments is less straightforward. Under related 
judgments individuals may not be able to use only the abstract code, as 
is hypothesized to be the case in identical judgments. Therefore, they 
should be slower than those under identical judgments. On the other 
hand, because the judgments are related, individuals can use the same 
interpretive schemata, which may not be less time-consuming than the 
reencoding of the stimulus information required in the case of unrelated 
judgments. 
The second implication of our analysis follows from the assumption 
that the encoding of the stimulus information over a series of judgments 
depends on the relationships among these judgments. Specifically, when 
the stimulus information is not activated during later judgments, which 
is hypothesized to be the case when the judgments are identical, it can 
receive no additional elaboration. On the other hand, when the stimulus 
information is activated, which is hypothesized to be the case if the 
judgments are either related or unrelated, it is quite likely to receive 
additional elaboration. 
There is, however, an important difference in the nature of elaboration 
under the conditions of related and unrelated judgments. When two 
judgments are related, then the schema used in processing the information 
during the first judgment will be similar to the one used in processing 
the information in the second judgment (or possibly even the very same 
schema). Hence, the elaborations and inferences made during successive 
judgments can accumulate. That is, each new judgment adds to the 
underlying representation so that at the end of the series it will constitute 
a relatively rich and strongly connected structure. 
If, on the other hand, the two judgments are unrelated, the stimulus 
information is likely to be processed within a dz&erent interpretive schema 
each time. Under these circumstances, the elaborations activated during 
an first judgment may be irrelevant to or inconsistent with those formed 
during the second. Thus, elaborations and inferences will not accumulate 
from one judgment to another, as is the case in related judgments, but 
rather, those made during the earlier judgment must be replaced during 
the second judgment. In short, after a series of unrelated judgments, 
therefore, the stimulus information will be less strongly interconnected 
than after a series of related judgments. The upshot of this analysis is 
that memory for a trait description that has undergone several related 
judgments ought to be superior to the memory for a trait description 
SOCIAL JUDGMENT 425 
that has undergone either several unrelated or several indentical judgments 
(J. Anderson, 1976; Craik & Tulving, 1975; Reder, 1979). 
EXPERIMENT 1 
Impressions are expected to be formed most rapidly when the old and 
new judgments are identical, less rapidly when they are related, and most 
slowly when they are unrelated. As to memory for the stimulus information, 
namely, the trait description giving rise to the impression, it ought to be 
most easily retrieved following related judgments and least easily retrieved 
following identical judgments. To test these hypotheses, subjects were 
presented with descriptions of hypothetical individuals and were asked 
to make one, three, or five judgments on the basis of each description. 
Judgments varied in their degree of relateness, so that they were either 
identical, related, or unrelated. Following the judgments, subjects were 
given a surprise recognition test for the traits in the original descriptions. 
Method 
Subjects 
Eighteen undergraduate students at the University of Michigan participated in the experiment 
as a part of their introductory psychology class requirement. 
Apparatus 
Subjects were seated in individual booths, equipped with a 12-in. CRT monitor, a six- 
button response panel (buttons labeled from “1” to “6”), and two single-buttons boxes 
(labeled OLD and NEW). Presentation of the stimuli was controlled by a PDP-1 l/20 computer, 
with subjects’ responses and latencies recorded under a program control. 
Design 
Each description (three traits) was judged one, three, or five times. These judgments 
were either similar to each other (related judgments hereafter), unrelated, or identical (i.e., 
the same judgment was repeated). Every subject rated two trait descriptions in each 
combination of the above factors (repetitions and judgment type). 
Stimuli 
Descriptions. Eighteen descriptions were constructed from traits drawn from N. Anderson 
(1968). Each description contained a common name and three traits (e.g., “Mike is naive, 
prideful, and shy”). The traits were assigned to descriptions randomly with the following 
restrictions: (a) likability value between 225 and 375; (b) the three traits in a description 
were not antonyms or synonyms; and (c) the traits were not synonyms or antonyms of 
the judgment dimensions. 
Judgments. The dimensions for the related judgments were taken from the same cluster 
of personality characteristics in Rosenberg (1977, p. 228). The dimensions for the unrelated 
and identical judgments were drawn at random from N. Anderson’s (1968) list of adjectives 
(see Footnote 1). Three different sets of dimensions were used in the experiment. Each 
set contained 5 related dimensions, 5 unrelated dimensions, and an 1 lth dimension to be 
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used in the identical judgments.’ Subjects were presented with all 11 dimensions from one 
set (5 related, 5 unrelated and 1 identical), 7 dimensions from a second set (3 related, 3 
unrelated, and 1 identical), and 3 dimensions from the third set (the single judgments). 
Sets were rotated between subjects, and dimensions were selected randomly within dimension 
type. Trait descriptions and judgment dimensions were paired randomly and differently 
for each subject. 
Procedure 
Judgmental phase. In each trial the name of the person associated with the description 
was presented on the CRT screen. One second later, the description (three traits) and the 
dimension of judgment were displayed. The dimension of judgment appeared embedded 
within a 6-point response scale. For example, subjects were asked to rate how HONEST 
Mike is, given that he “naive, prideful, shy.” Their response was given on a 6-point scale, 
with “1” marked with not at all HONEST, and “6” marked with extremely HONEST. 
Subjects indicated their response by pressing one of six buttons that corresponded to the 
above scale. Once the response was made, the screen was erased and a new trial began. 
Subjects were not told whether they would rate the stimulus information once, three 
times, or five times. Rather, they were warned that they may have to form impressions 
more than once on the same stimulus person. They were instructed to consider all the 
information associated with the stimulus person every time before they responded. To 
maximize the availability of the past judgments, subjects received each description, and 
made all judgments of that particular description, on successive trials. There were 54 trials 
in this phase. 
Recognition phase. During each trial subjects were presented with a name of a person 
accompanied by two traits. One of these traits was always a member of the description 
of that person. In half of the trials, the second trait in the recognition probe was a completely 
new trait (a “new” probe”). In the remaining trials both traits in the probe had appeared 
together in the description (an “old” probe). Subjects were asked to determine whether 
the probe in each trial was old or new. They responded by pressing a button with the 
label OLD to indicate an old probe, and another button labeled NEW otherwise. There 
were 108 trials in this part (3 old and 3 new for each one of the 18 descriptions). The 3 
old probes consist of the three possible pairs of traits, the 3 new probes consist of pairs 
of an old trait and a new one. 
As practice, prior to each phase of the experiment, subjects rated descriptions different 
from those that appear in the study proper. The order of presentation of the descriptions 
and judgment dimensions as well as the pairing of descriptions to dimensions of judgments 
were randomized differently for each subject. 
Judgmental Phase 
Results and Discussion 
Subjects formed an impression of a person based on a trait description 
one, three, or five times. These judgments were either identical, related, 
or unrelated to each other. Judgment latencies (i.e., the time interval 
’ The following three sets of dimensions were used in the experiment. The first 5 dimensions 
in each set were used for the related judgments, the second 5 were used for the unrelated 
judgments, and the 11th was used for the identical judgments: Set 1: happy, humorous, 
popular, warm, sociable, kindly, opportunist, reasonable, spendthrift, productive, casual; 
Set 2: helpful, modest, sentimental, sincere, tolerant, well spoken, forgiving, patient, 
apprehensive, resigned, responsible; Set 3: artistic, daring, persistent, skillful, intelligent, 
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FIG. 1. Judgment latency as a function of judgment repetition and judgment relatedness 
(Experiment I). 
from the appearance of the description on the CRT to the subject’s 
response) were averaged for each subject, separately in each level of 
judgment type x judgment repetition (i.e., the first time the description 
was rated, the second time, . . . , the fifth time). The means are presented 
in Fig. 1. 
Two analyses were performed on these latencies. First, in order to 
assess the main effect of judgment repetition (averaged over judgment 
types), the entire data set was analyzed in a two-way repeated measures 
ANOVA Ljudgment type (identical, related, unrelated) x judgment rep- 
etition (1,2,3,4,5)]. The main effect due to judgment type as well as the 
interaction, however, could not be evaluated from this analysis because 
the first judgment, by definition, is neither identical, related, or unrelated. 
Therefore, the main effect of judgment type as well as the interaction 
were assessed from an ANOVA using a reduced data set, that is, excluding 
the results from the first judgments. The same procedure was applied in 
all analyses reported herein. 
It was hypothesized that the tendency to base the current judgment 
on the previous ones will depend on the similarity between the judgments. 
There was, in fact, a significant judgment-type effect, F(2, 34) = 11.50, 
p < .Ol, indicating that unrelated judgments (M = 6.41 s) took longer 
to make, albeit not significantly so, than related judgments (6.02), which 
in turn took significantly longer than identical judgments (4.35, f = 3.21).* 
* A 95% confidence level is used in the pairwise comparisons. 
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The speed of judgment was also determined by the judgment repetition, 
F(4, 68) = 23.87, p < .Ol. As expected, later judgments were faster 
than earlier ones. Trend analysis with orthogonal trend components revealed 
a linear, F(1, 17) = 39.50, as well as a quadratic, F(1, 17) = 18.90, 
effects. Inspection of Fig. 1 suggests that the largest drop in latencies 
occurs between the first (M = 8.57 s) and the second (M = 6.39) 
judgments. The decrease in judgment latencies between the second and 
the third (M = 5.42) was also statistically significant. There seemed to 
be no improvement in judgment speed beyond the third repetition. 
The interaction between judgment type and judgment repetition failed 
to reach significance, F(6, 102) = 1.60, p = .15, indicating that the 
pattern of superiority of identical judgments to related judgments and of 
related judgments to unrelated judgments tends not to vary across 
repetitions. 
Recognition Phase 
During this part of the experiment subjects were presented with six 
recognition probes for each original description (from the judgmental 
phase). For each subject we computed the proportion of correct responses 
for each combination of judgment type (identical, related, or unrelated) 
and the number of judgments made in the first part (1, 3, or 5). Means 
are presented in Fig. 2. 
There was a statistically significant number of judgments effect, 
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FIG. 2. Recognition accuracy as a function of the number of judgments and their 
relatedness (Experiment 1). 
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inferior to that following three judgments (0.74). The latter, however, 
was not significantly different from accuracy following five judgments 
(0.76). 
Even though unrelated judgments took longer to make than related 
judgments, recognition accuracy under conditions of unrelated judgments 
was hypothesized to be inferior to that under related judgments. This 
follows from our assumption that the associative structure built during 
a new judgment cannot be easily assimilated to the one built during the 
old judgments when the judgments are unrelated, whereas it can when 
they are related. In fact, there was a statistically significant judgment- 
type effect, F(2, 34) = 6.79, p < .Ol. Recognition memory following 
related judgments (0.80) was superior to that following unrelated judgments 
(0.76, t = 2.10), and the latter was superior to the recognition memory 
following identical judgments (0.70, t = 3.15). The two-way interaction 
failed to reach significance, F(2, 34) = 1.17, p = .32, indicating that the 
superiority in recognition of related judgments over unrelated or identical 
judgments was not affected strongly by the repetitions (i.e., three or 
five). 
These results suggest that when the representation of the past judgment, 
that is, the abstract code, is available, people will use it as a function 
of the similarity between the judgments. This occurs even when the trait 
information is highly available. Suppose, however, the abstract code was 
not readily available. Then the trait description should be used regardless 
of the similarity between the judgments (cf. Jacoby, 1978). In this case, 
therefore, unlike that in Experiment 1 (a) the speed of judgments in a 
series should not vary with the relatedness of the judgments and (b) the 
memory strength of the stimulus information should vary as a function 
of the number of judgments (Hintzman, 1974, 1976; Johnston & Uhl, 
1976; Shaughnessy, 1976) but not as a function of the similarity between 




Eighteen undergraduate students at the University of Michigan participated in the experiment 
as a part of their introductory psychology class requirement. 
Stimuli, Design, and Procedure 
The trait descriptions, the dimensions of judgment, and the experimental design were 
identical to those in Experiment 1. The only difference between Experiment 1 and the 
present experiment lies in the order in which judgments were made. Recall that in Experiment 
1 each description and all judgments associated with it were presented in successive trials. 
In order to reduce the availability of past judgments, subjects in the present experiment 
received the descriptions and made the judgments in a random order, so that judgments 
of any one description were intermixed with judgments of other descriptions, with the 
constraint that they could not be made in succession. 
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Results and Discussion 
Judgmental Phase 
Judgment latencies were averaged for each subject in each level of 
judgment type x repetition. Figure 3 presents the means of these scores. 
There were marginally significant differences due to type of judgment, 
F(2, 34) = 3.08, p = .06. Even though this effect is much weaker than 
the corresponding effect in Experiment 1, it was similar in direction, 
namely unrelated judgments were most difficult to make (A4 = 9.1 s), 
whereas identical judgments were easiest to make (A4 = 8.0). There were 
no overall significant differences between the five repetitions, F(4, 68) 
= 1.51, p = .20, with none of the trend components being significant 
(F’s < 1). The interaction also failed to reach significance, F(8, 136) = 
0.42. It seems, therefore, that the manipulation succeeded in reducing 
the use of old judgments in making the new ones. 
Recognition Phase 
For each subject the proportion of correct responses was computed 
for each level of judgment type and number of judgments. They are 
displayed in Fig. 4. 
The judgment latency results (above) indicate that there was little 
difference in the degree of use of the stimulus information as a function 
of judgment type. Correspondingly, accuracy performance should not be 
highly influenced by this factor. There were, in fact, no statistically 
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FIG. 4. Recognition accuracy as a function of the number of judgments and their 
relatedness (Experiment 2). 
significant differences between the three types of judgments, F(2, 34) = 
1.59, p = .2. Furthermore, since the stimulus information is activated 
in memory every time a judgment is made, regardless of whether the 
judgments is identical, related, or unrelated, its representation ought to 
be strengthened with additional judgments. Indeed, the number of judg- 
ments effect was statistically significant, F(2, 34) = 15.22, p < .Ol, and 
this effect did not vary as a function of the type of judgments, as indicated 
by the nonsignificant interaction, F(2, 34) = 0.35. 
The results of the two experiments provide support for the proposed 
model: When past judgments were highly available (i.e., Experiment 1). 
the extent to which they (rather than the stimulus information) determined 
the present judgment increased with the similarity between the judgments. 
However, when the past judgments were not highly available (i.e., Ex- 
periment 2), the differences between the three types of judgments di- 
minished considerably. A third experiment was carried out to provide 
still further evidence along these lines. 
EXPERIMENT 3 
This experiment attempted to replicate the finding of Experiment 1 
using a different recognition measure. During the recognition phase in 
our first two experiments, subjects were presented with either an “old” 
probe (i.e., a name and two traits that were both in the original description), 
or a “new” probe (i.e., a name and two traits, one of which was not 
part of any original description). We assumed that the associative links 
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between the two traits in an “old” probe were stronger than those 
between the two traits in the “new” probe and that the difference in 
strength was an increasing function of the kind of encoding (i.e., whether 
elaborations do or do not accumulate) as well as the repetitions. 
Experiment 3 used a stronger version of the recognition test. During 
each trial subjects were presented with four traits. Three of the traits 
belonged to the same original description. The fourth was a member of 
a merent description. Note, however, that all four traits appeared equally 
often during the judgment phase. Subjects were to indicate the three 
traits that belonged to the same description. 
This recognition test has two advantages over the “old/new” technique 
used in the previous experiments. First, it is a forced-choice procedure 
and hence it reduces possibilities of response biases. Second, the recognition 
reponse cannot be made on the basis of the familiarity of the information 
but rather must be made on the basis of its organization (Mandler, 1980). 
In other words, because all four traits appeared during the judgment 




Twenty-four students at the Hebrew University participated in the experiment. All were 
native English speakers. They were paid for their participation. 
Stimuli and Design 
The trait descriptions, the dimensions of judgment, and the experimental design were 
identical to those in Experiment 1. During the judgment phase, each subject rated two 
descriptions in each combination of judgment type (identical, related, and unrelated) and 
number of judgments (one, three, and five). In the recognition phase, subjects were tested 
twice with each of the 18 original descriptions. 
Procedure 
The judgmental phase was identical to that in Experiment 1. During each trial in the 
recognition phase, a name and two cue traits appeared on the screen. Shortly after, two 
additional traits (the choice traits, hereafter) were also displayed. One of the choice traits, 
the correct alternative, had been presented together with the two cue traits and the name 
during the judgment phase. The other choice trait, the foil, belonged to a different description. 
Subjects were to indicate which of the two choice traits was the correct alternative. They 
responded by pressing one of six buttons that corresponded to the following scale: If  the 
left-side choice trait was the correct alternative, they were to press one of the buttons 
labeled “l”, “2”, or “3” (“1” indicated most confident, “3” indicated least conJdent). 
I f  the right-side choice trait was the correct alternative, they were to press one of the 
numbers “4”, “S’, or “6” (“4” indicated least confident, “6” indicated most co&dent). 
The position of the correct alternative was determined randomly in each trial. 
Descriptions containing foils and correct alternatives were selected randomly for each 
subject with the constraint that the description containing the foil was rated during the 
judgment phase the same number of times as the description containing the correct alternative. 
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Results and Discussion 
Judgment Phase 
The mean judgment latencies in the different conditions appear in Fig. 
5. There were significant differences between the five repetitions, 
F(4, 92) = 74.20, p < .Ol. Trend analysis revealed significant linear, 
F(1, 23) = 111.26, quadratic, F(1, 23) = 68.63, and cubic F(1, 23) = 
33.41 components. The pattern of means paralleled that in Experiment 
1. The largest drop in judgment latencies occurred between the first (11.23 
s) and the second (6.24) judgments. The difference between the second 
and third judgments (5.46 s) was also significant. The third, fourth (5.47 
s), and f&h (5.74 s) judgments were not different from each other. 
There were significant differences due to the type of judgment, 
F(2, 46) = 52.24, p < .Ol. In accordance with Lingle and Ostrom (1979), 
unrelated judgments took longer to make (7.32 s) than related judgments 
(6.30, t = 2.37), which, in turn, took longer to make than identical 
judgments (3.56, t = 6.37). As in Experiment 1, the interaction was not 
significant, F(6, 138) = 1.75, p = .ll. 
Recognition Phase 
During each recognition trial, subjects were given two cue traits and 
two choice traits. They were to indicate which of the choice traits belonged 
to the same description as the cue traits. Responses were given on a 6- 
point scale that reflected both the accuracy of response and the confidence 
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FIG. 5. Judgment latency as a function of judgment repetition and judgment relatedness 
(Experiment 3). 
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in the response. The results were analyzed with and without the confidence 
component. Both analyses led to the same conclusions. To facilitate 
comparison to the earlier experiments we report the analyses based on 
the proportion of correct responses while ignoring the confidence com- 
ponent of that response. 
For each subject we computed the proportion of correct responses in 
each combination of judgment type and number of judgments. Means 
are presented in Fig. 6. There was a significant number of judgments 
effect, F(2, 46) = 8.26, p < .Ol, namely, recognition performance following 
a single judgment (0.67) was inferior to that following three judgments 
(0.77) and five judgments (0.81). As in Experiment 1, there was a sign&ant 
judgment-type effect, F(2,46) = 3.49, p < .05, with recognition following 
identical judgments (0.73) being significantly inferior to that following 
unrelated judgments (0.81) and related judgments (0.84, t > 2.75). However, 
even though the pattern of recognition results for related and unrelated 
judgments was in the hypothesized direction, the null hypothesis of no 
difference cannot be rejected (t = 1.03). The interaction failed to reach 
significance, F(2, 46) = 1.76, p = .18. 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
This paper explored the conditions under which individuals use the 
abstract code or the gist of past judgment instead of stimulus information 
to arrive at their present judgement. In an impression formation task it 
was hypothesized that the new impression will tend to be based on an 
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old one if the new can be inferred from the old and if the old impression 
is readily available in memory. Use of the abstract code (rather than the 
trait information) was indicated in two different ways: First, we assumed 
that it takes longer to compute a judgment from the stimulus information 
than to infer it from a previous judgment. Second, it was argued that 
the use of the stimulus information should be manifested in changes in 
its representation in memory. Specifically, it was suggested that if the 
stimulus information is utilized during a judgment, its memory strength 
(as indicated by a recognition test) will be stronger than when it is not 
utilized. 
Experiments 1 and 3 indicate that the similarity between the present 
and past judgments affect the extent to which the abstract code is used 
instead of or in addition to the stimulus information. Experiment 2 pointed 
out, however, that the effect of similarities between judgments can be 
moderated considerably by reducing the availability of the abstract code. 
That is to say, when an interpolated activity, here, other judgments, 
occurred between the old and new judgments, individuals tended to use 
the stimulus information regardless of the degree of similarity between 
the judgments. 
Our theorectical account of the findings rests on the assumption that 
the three types of judgment differed only in the similarity of their underlying 
dimensions. However, it can be argued that since the traits used to anchor 
the related scales were different from those used to anchor the unrelated 
or identical scales (see Footnote l), the differences attributed to judgment 
type were mediated by the idiosyncratic features of the traits themselves. 
In order to explore this possibility we examined the results from the 
single judgments in the three experiments and tested to see whether there 
are differences due to the type of judgment. Obviously, since these data 
were based on a single judgement, any such difference indicates systematic 
differences between the trait dimensions underlying the three types of 
judgments. In fact, there were no significant differences due to judgment 
type for judgment latency, F(2, 114) = 2.51, p = .09, or for accuracy 
(F < 1). The respective means for the related, unrelated, and identical 
judgment conditions were 9.35, 9.92, and 10.07 for latency and were 
0.67, 0.68, and 0.68 for accuracy. 
It can be argued that with repeated judgments the representation of 
the stimulus information become increasingly primed, and hence, the 
stimulus information can be categorized or interpreted more quickly 
(Higgins & King, 1981; Schvaneveldt, Meyer, & Becker, 1976). Since 
identical judgments require activation of the same encoding structure 
each time whereas unrelated judgments require activation of different 
memory structures, the facilitation produced by priming during identical 
judgments will be greater than that produced during unrelated judgments. 
As a result, it should be easier to process the stimulus information when 
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the judgments are identical than when they are unrelated. This model, 
therefore, makes the same prediction in respect to judgment latency as 
our own. 
The two models differ, however, in respect to predictions about the 
consequences of repeated judgments for the representation of the stimulus 
information in memory. The difference between the two models has to 
do with whether and when the stimulus information is activated and 
elaborated upon. If the stimulus information is activated during each of 
the judgments, and the decrease in judgment latencies is produced by 
the increase in priming, than recognition performance should be best 
following identical judgments. This was clearly not the case. It seems 
that even though the stimulus information was readily available, individuals 
used their past impressions and not the stimulus information while making 
identical judgments. 
It has been suggested that once a judgment is formed it is stored 
separately from the stimulus information (e.g., N. Anderson & Farkas, 
1973; N. Anderson & Hubert, 1963; Posner & Snyder, 1975; Schul, 1983). 
Alternatively, Wyer et al. (1984) argued recently that the gist or impression 
as well as the stimulus information underlying it are stored within a single 
representatifon (see also Loken, 1984). Such a single-representation model 
implies that activation of a central element, such as the impression, ought 
to increase the activation level of every element in the representation, 
including, of course, the stimulus information. This seems to be inconsistent 
with our findings. At least in the case of identical judgments, subjects 
in Experiments 1 and 3 were able to bring to mind the old judgments 
and ignore the knowledge that originally gave rise to it. Thus, our results 
indicate that the abstract code, the impression, may be stored separately 
and accessed independently of the stimulus information. 
Separating the abstract code of the past judgment from the representation 
of the underlying stimulus information may prove useful in arriving at 
a general understanding of attitudinal phenomena (cf. Loken, 1984). In 
particular it suggests that attitudes can be formed in two distinct ways, 
either by integrating some stimulus information and abstracting the attitude 
from it or by computing the attitude on the basis of a past attitude, 
without taking into account the information underlying the latter. Most 
of the social psychological research has focused on the relationship between 
the underlying information and the resultant attitude (e.g., N. Anderson, 
1981). Still, research does demonstrate the existence of “attitude-based” 
attitudes. Hartley (1946), for example, showed that people were quite 
capable of forming attitudes about a nonexistent ethnic group. Clearly, 
such attitudes cannot be based on knowledge about the groups, but must 
follow from some inferential process by which judgments about the non- 
existent groups are derived from those toward existing ones. The Halo 
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effect found in impression formation (e.g., Kaplan, 1975) is also consistent 
with this phenomenon. 
Finally, a caveat is in order. If one had asked subjects in Experiment 
2 to try to recall their previous judgments, it is likely that in many cases 
they would have succeeded (cf. Lingle & Ostrom, 1979). Still, the results 
suggests that past judgments were only minimally utilized. Thus, infor- 
mation that was available for one task (i.e., recall) was not available for 
another (i.e., judgment). Availability, then, is not simply a function of 
whether or not the stimulus information is in memory. It is also determined 
by the goals of performance. This may partly explain the low correlations 
typically found between the recall of stimulus information and its impact 
on the judgment (e.g., N. Anderson & Hubert, 1963; Dreben, Fiske, & 
Hastie, 1979; Greenwald, 1968; Riskey, 1979; Wyer et al., 1984). 
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